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ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVALUATION: 
CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY?
Abstract
Accountability and evaluation have become an integral part of education systems and the day-
to-day practice of educators in many countries around the world. The purpose of this presen-
tation is to share an exploration of the links among evaluation, accountability and democracy 
which draws on the work of the French philosopher Jacques Rancière. It will be argued that 
evaluation and accountability intertwine not just as a condition for democracy and its improve-
ment but also as a challenge for democracy. Firstly, the notion of evaluation and its relevance
to accountability will be outlined. A more detailed outline of accountability will follow in or-
der to present evaluation and accountability as “explanatory scheme” [Rancière 2010]; that is, 
an structure that primarily serves to explain and provide justifi cation. To conclude, connections 
between accountability and democracy will be discussed and challenges posed by the former 
one to the latter one are explored.
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Introduction
Accountability and evaluation have become an integral part of education systems 
and the day-to-day practice of educators in many countries around the world. 
Practices, professionals and institutions concerned with assessment, scrutiny, au-
dit and inspection continue to proliferate and the demand for them is widespread 
and mounting [Newman & Clarke 2009]. In this regard, schools are not different 
to other organizations and institutions today. Schools are also affected by this 
trend. The purpose of this presentation is to share an exploration of the links 
among evaluation, accountability and democracy which draws on the work of the 
French philosopher Jacques Rancière. It will be argued that evaluation and ac-
countability intertwine not just as a condition for democracy and its improvement 
but, maybe, also as a challenge for democracy.
This article is divided into three parts. Firstly, the notion of evaluation and its 
relevance to accountability will be outlined in order to highlight resemblances to 
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accountability. An outline of accountability will follow. In this section, a number 
of core features will be emphasized in order to present evaluation and accountabil-
ity as an “explanatory scheme” [Rancière 2010]; that is, an structure that serves to 
make sense of, explain and, thus, provide justifi cation. To conclude, connections 
between accountability and democracy will be discussed. After introducing the 
conventional account of the relationships between accountability and democracy, 
challenges posed by accountability to democracy are explored.
The relevance of evaluation to accountability
Accountability evokes evaluation and evaluation evokes accountability. 
Similarities and differences are not always made explicit, but, nevertheless, you 
will usually fi nd both terms accompanying each other. Evaluation is usually as-
sumed to serve different purposes. Accountability is often mentioned as one of 
them. It is not unusual to present accountability as a purpose or function of evalu-
ation. In this view, evaluation would serve accountability and, in turn, fulfi llment 
of this function would serve to justify evaluation [Perrin 2007]. For instance, 
evaluation is used to document what has been done and accomplished with the 
available resources in order to answer to those who fund or provide them [Mayne 
2007]. If evaluation indeed serves to provide answers and justifi cation through 
evidence, this use is likely to provide answers on “why evaluate” and justifi cation 
to evaluation. In this way, evaluation supports accountability, although, if so, ac-
countability will be supporting evaluation as well.
The accountability function of evaluation is fulfi lled in the context of govern-
ance and policy-making [Hanberger 2011]. Usually, evaluation for accountability 
is deployed within this context. Therefore, accountability mechanisms may be 
considered to be a policy instrument [Spillane 2004] (for instance, like induce-
ments). Evaluation constitutes a major accountability mechanism. Notice that it 
means that evaluation is subordinated to accountability and, hence, to policy-
making and governance. Of course, this is not the sole function of evaluation in 
that context. Evaluation may be thought to serve other purposes such as policy 
improvement or legitimation. However, the fulfi llment of the accountability func-
tion is likely to be related to the fulfi llment of these other functions: for instance, 
the contribution of evaluation to accountability is likely to promote improvement 
or legitimation as well. In fact, the purpose of evaluation and accountability is 
often said to be improvement of teaching and learning [e.g. Reeves 2002].
Furthermore, it might be said that accountability and evaluation interweave 
dynamically and even overlap. Before concentrating on it, here is a brief intro-
duction to accountability that will be of assistance in highlighting such connec-
tions between both notions: 
First, decide what values we want individuals and organizations to uphold. Next, specify 
what it means to uphold these values by codifying them into very specifi c rules, procedu-
res, and standards: Don’t do this. Do do that. Then create numerous reporting mechanisms 
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to demonstrate that these rules, procedures, and standards have been followed. Finally, 
give a separate organization the specifi c task of auditing these records to check whether 
the rules, procedures, and standards have been followed. And, if these auditors discover 
any failures, lapses, or discrepancies, they identify the culprits so that we can hold them 
accountable – so that we can punish them [Behn 2001: 7]. 
This is accountability.
And what is evaluation? An extensive analysis is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, but a minimal delineation of evaluation is provided now in order to highlight 
connections again. A standard conceptualization is used. Evaluation has been 
defi ned as “the systematic collection and interpretation of evidence, leading, as 
a part of the process to a judgement of value with a view to action” [Beeby 1978, 
in: Wolf 1990: 3]. According to Wolf [1990: 3−6], this defi nition embodies four 
core elements of evaluation: a) systematic collection of evidence, b) its interpreta-
tion, c) judgement of value and d) action.
a) Systematic collection of evidence implies that information needs to be 
gathered. In addition, it is also implying that information needs to be ac-
quired in a systematic way.
b) Interpretation of evidence is highlighting that evaluation does not con-
sist merely of collection of evidence and providing information which de-
scribes something. Collected evidence is to be analyzed and made sense 
of with great care. Systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of 
evidence provides a reporting mechanism required for accountability. 
c) The incorporation of the third element of the defi nition, judgement of 
value, reveals that evaluation neither is exhausted in description nor is 
mere interpretation of that being described. Evaluation also implies dra-
wing judgements about the worth of something. A value judgement is 
a statement that ascribes value to something: when saying that something 
is good or is better, you are making a value judgement. The ascription of 
value depends not only upon the object itself but also upon the evaluating 
subjects [Kraft 1981: 131]. These judgements are to be drawn as reasona-
bly and as carefully as possible, and a major basis for doing this should 
be the evidence that has been systematically gathered and interpreted. 
But this is not suffi cient. To be sure, evidence cannot answer the question 
whether (or not) something is good or better. Subjects need to answer. But 
evidence can and must assist subjects in answering. There is an additio-
nal condition to be met: subjectivity need to be identifi ed and defi ned in 
order to be neutralized or, at least, controlled. Therefore, some kind of 
normative references or standards are usually considered (certain goals or 
objectives, for instance). These are the standards embodying individual 
or institutional values which are required in accountability in order to state 
whether something is of value. Evidence will assist in demonstrating that 
such standards have been met.
d) The fourth element, orientation to action, raises that the undertaking re-
sulting in a judgment of value is deliberately tackled for the sake of fu-
ture action and achievements. The decision on future action (for instan-
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ce, punishment), taken in light of the judgement of that being evaluated, 
may be conceived of as another judgement of value because there will be 
a statement ascribing value to a choice. This second judgement is howe-
ver usually within the scope of agents other than evaluators (for instance, 
policymakers).
But what is accountability?
Accountability will be the specifi c focus now. This notion is sometimes quite 
slippery and “constantly changing” [Behn 2001: 3]. Bovens [2007: 449] has sug-
gested that, in contemporary discourse, it “often serves as a conceptual umbrella 
that covers various other distinct concepts”. In order to provide a more detailed 
outline, I will be referring to some key dimensions in what follows. They will 
be responsibility, documentation, performance, transparency and participation. 
Responsibility and documentation would have to do with what accountability 
itself consist of; performance and transparence are rather connected with the 
object of accountability, and participation points to the subjects of accountability. 
Of course, these are interrelated elements, and relationships will be emphasized 
as well.
Responsibility. Two meanings of the word “accountability” have been dis-
tinguished. In a broader sense, accountability is considered to be associated 
with responsibility “and carries connotations of ‘being answerable to’” [Biesta 
2004: 234]. To be more accurate, it may be said that responsibility is implied by 
accountability but the reverse is not necessarily the case. At least in academic 
terms, responsibility is not exhausted in accountability and is often conceived of 
as encompassing more dimensions [Cane 2002; Bovens 1998: 24−26]. But there 
is a conventional conception of accountability and responsibility which virtually 
confl ates both concepts [Raffoul 2010]. In her glossary of education terms, the 
infl uential scholar Diane Ravitch virtually equates accountability and responsi-
bility. According to her, accountability is “the concept that individuals (e.g. stu-
dents, teachers, or administrators) or organizations (e.g. schools, school districts, 
or state departments of education) should be held responsible for improving stu-
dent achievement” [Ravitch 2007: 8].
Documentation. In a narrower sense, accountability refers to the duty to 
present auditable accounts of activities [Biesta 2004]. Historically, the concept 
of accountability is closely related to accounting in fi nancial contexts. This logic 
would have simply been transposed to the managerial context, without much con-
sideration of the extent to which it is appropriate for managerial purposes. As 
stated by Biesta [2004: 235], “rather than adapting the principles of the audit 
process to the specifi cs and requirements of a different context, (...) the culture 
of accountability has led to a situation in which practices had to adapt to the 
principles of the auditing process”. For him, this meaning and the former one are 
largely distinct and the link between them is quite weak. In his view, there would 
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be overlap between both meanings only insofar as it is legitimate to assume that 
the provision of auditable documentation is synonymous with responsible be-
havior [Charlton, in: Biesta 2004: 235]. However, both aspects are seemingly 
not so far from each other. A number of scholars fi nd the core of responsibility 
“in the idea of having to answer for something, or of giving an account” [Cane 
2002: 30]. Being a respondent has to do with one’s answering for things (for 
instance, successful performance) and justifying a position [Buchmann 1985: 
2; Behn 2001: 4]. Being responsible has to do with having the capacity to be 
such a respondent. Moreover, it might be added that the responsible person is 
one “who is ‘likely to be in a position to give a satisfactory account of his con-
duct’ because he realizes “‘that an account of his conduct can be appropriately 
called for’ and acts accordingly”[Haydon 1978, in: Cane 2002: 33]. To be able to 
be such a respondent, one will need to support his/her answering. Evidence is 
likely to provide such support. Hence, it might be said that being responsible re-
quires documentation. Accordingly, accountability in education usually requires 
“measurable proof” that relevant constituencies (teachers, schools, authorities) 
are teaching students effi ciently and well [Ravitch 2007: 8]. 
Performance. A further point to made on the relationships between both con-
cepts (responsibility and accountability) is that, as suggested by the defi nition 
by Ravitch included above, accountability usually assumes that agents are to be 
held responsible for success. However, success would need to be understood in 
a broad sense to include the two following dimensions. On the one hand, effects 
and results are part of the focus of accountability. But accountability is focused 
not just on what agents actually accomplish (or do not accomplish) but also on 
how agents do what they do in order to reach such achievements [Behn 2001]. 
Hence, actions are, on the other hand, another part of the focus of accountability. 
In education, accountability is increasingly conceived of not merely as an analy-
sis of effect variables (for instance, attendance rates or test scores) but rather as 
a deep and, probably, dynamic analysis of cause-and effect-variables which also 
include curriculum and teaching and leadership practices (and not only income, 
social background or ethnicity) as cause variables. In fact, what is particularly 
needed to know is not merely information on results but the causes of those re-
sults [Reeves 2002]. 
However, it may be said that what one can be held accountable for is not 
(causal) actions and effects themselves. Usually, one is rather held accountable 
for the extent to which actions and effects adhere to standards. Therefore, ac-
countability is often equated to individual or collective responsibility to conform 
standards – either in form of achievements (for instance, a goal or an objective) 
or in form of performance (for instance, functions established in some way − by 
law, regulation or agreement) [Behn 2001]. Standards are set to hold somebody 
accountable. To be made accountable, actions and results (and the subjects them-
selves) need to be adhered to standards. 
As already suggested, a belief underlying accountability is usually that ac-
tions (including the harmful ones) lead to the corresponding effects (including 
the harmful ones) and that, in turn, effects are traceable to actions. This traceabil-
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ity is made possible by documenting events. Documentation will allow locating 
the barriers to expected actions and achievements “without getting caught up in 
confusing complexities involving interests, obscure motives, and political games 
of assigning blame” [Marres 2010]. Thus, pressure to develop standardization 
and evidence-based processes aiming at allegedly improving accountability is 
increasingly identifi able.
But there is also an expectation and even a remarkable certainty that punish-
ment will be accompanying accountability; that is, something bad (and absence 
of anything good) is expected to happen to those who are accountable when they 
do something bad (namely, bad actions or results or, also, absence of good actions 
and results) [Raffoul 2010; se also Behn 2001: 3]. This is rooted to the usage in 
fi nancial contexts, in which the purpose of auditing is often “to detect and de-
ter incompetence and dishonesty in the handling of money” [Biesta 2004: 235]. 
Nevertheless, formal defi nitions usually do not even mention the word “punish-
ment”, although people seeking to hold someone accountable usually envision 
some kind of punishment if failure happens or expected success is not achieved 
[Behn 2001: 4]. 
Transparency. In the end, accountability demands transparency. Account-
ability requires information and documentation able to trace an object or product. 
This leads to transparency; that is, to visibility [Newman & Clarke 2009]. But 
what is to be visible? “In a physical sense, transparency means that you can see 
through some medium to an object on the other side” [Oliver 2004: 3]. Because 
of transparency, something is rendered visible. In organizational and social con-
texts, transparency is “letting the truth be available for others” in order to see it 
“without trying to hide or shade the meaning, or altering the facts to put things in 
a better light” [Oliver 2004: 3].
(Empowered) participation. The word “accountability” goes back to Latin – 
to computare. This other word is the compound of ‘com’, which meant ‘together’ 
and ‘putare’, which meant ‘to count’ [Behn 2001: 6−7]. Up to this point, the focus 
has been on what is counted for accountability. Now the focus will be on who 
counts for accountability. Accountability affects and involves people relating to 
one another. It has been characterised as a social relationship (Bovens, 2007,
p. 450). But who are those people? Virtually everybody is a tentative answer. 
There are indeed an increasing number of people concerned with and, at least 
in a some extent, involved in accountability. Evidence is seemingly available on 
“the public’s demand for accountability” [Moore & Gates, in: Behn 2001: 2]. It 
might be said, in particular, that “everyone wants people − often other people − to 
be held accountable” [Behn 2001: 2]. In turn, there is an increase of the number 
people held accountable. But this widespread concern with and involvement in 
accountability reveals, once again, that there are those who are accountable and 
those who hold them accountable. 
The accountability holder can be a specifi c person or agency, but can also be 
a more virtual entity, as the public opinion [Bovens 2005]. Among the account-
ability holders, there are people whose sole or main task is holding other people 
accountable − regardless they are likely to be accountable to other people as 
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well, although sometimes they also come to believe that they are accountable to 
no one. But often they constitute a “forum” before which accounts and answers 
need to be provided [Bovens 1998]. This forum may come to be very comprehen-
sive. There is a public accountability which involves the citizenry as a whole and 
makes this involvement public (namely, open or at least accessible to citizens), 
in contrast to other forms of internal accountability in which the membership of 
the forum is more restricted and the account giving is likely to be confi dential 
or even secret [Bovens 2005]. In either case, it might be concluded that there is 
a remarkable degree of participation which empowers those involved to exercise 
control over what affects themselves [Bovens 2007].
Among those who are accountable, there are usually people who assume that 
they will need to give accounts to the former ones − regardless they are likely to 
considered to be, in turn, included among those who are accountability holders, 
albeit in a broader sense. Behn [2001: 2] that “it’s great to be an accountability 
holder”, whilst “it’s not so much fun to be an accountability holdee”. However, 
the confl ation of accountability and responsibility depicts a quite powerful agent 
playing a relevant role. Following Raffoul [2010] the accountability holdees can 
be understood in two senses:
In a fi rst sense, responsibility (confl ated with accountability) refers to be- –
ing responsible for one’s actions and, in the end, being responsible for 
oneself. It conveys the idea of “authorship over one’s actions and over one-
self” [Raffoul 2010: 10]. In this view, the self constitutes the boundaries 
within which responsibility is contained. Interestingly, responsibility in 
this sense becomes “an act of appropriation” [Raffoul 2010: 11], because 
he or she controls and owns his/her actions and, furthermore, owns him-
self or herself – it might be said. 
In a second sense, responsibility designates being responsible  – for the con-
sequences of one’s actions. There is no rupture but “an important addition” 
here [Raffoul 2010:11]. In the fi rst instance, the emphasis is essentially on 
the past, as one is asked to answer for his or her past actions. But in this 
other instance, the focus in on consequences of his or her actions and, hen-
ce, one “is looking toward the future of the act. In this sense, responsibility 
is being accountable for the future, for what has not yet happened” or for 
“what is still coming” [Raffoul 2010: 11]. Note that one is still respon-
sible for oneself, particularly if such a responsibility toward the future is 
conceived of as arising from the links between the actions and conseque-
nces, which, in turn, allow calculating the effects of one’s actions in the
future.
Note that, in this view, being accountable is on condition of being considered 
as the cause of actions and its consequences through the freedom of the will and 
deliberate intention. In the view which assimilates responsibility to accountabil-
ity, responsibility refers to “the capacity of an agent to be the cause and ground 
of its acts” [Raffoul 2010: 6], and accountability then presupposes an able and 
willful individual as cause. Following Raffoul [2010: 8−10], four tenets underpin 
this view:
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The belief that the human being is an agent or a subject and, hence, the  –
reliance on subjectivity as foundation or ground of imputation.
The notion that the subject is a voluntary agent and, thus, the reliance on  –
the voluntary and so-called “free will”.
The belief that responsibility is the cause of the act; that is, “to be the ‚cau- –
se of’ and to be ‚responsible for’ are confl ated”. It means the reliance on 
causality of responsibility.
The assumption that the responsible being is a rational subject. In other  –
words, the basis for responsibility is rational agency.
This description of those who are responsible and accountable is likely to 
evoke an image of powerful and even sovereign subjects. If you are responsible, 
you allegedly decide and are in charge: you are in a position of power. However, 
this understanding is in sharp contrast to what follows. Those who are responsi-
ble are subject not only to stringent duties and expectations but also to be scru-
tinized with regard to fulfi llment. Moreover, lack of adherence to these duties 
and expectations takes them to be tracked and sanctioned. In the end, the subject 
becomes the subjected [Raffoul 2010: 21]. 
Accountability for democracy?
Accountability is often regarded as a “hallmark of modern democratic govern-
ance” [Dubnick & Yang 2011: 171]. As in ancient Greece, direct democracy pri-
marily consists of the gathering of citizens in public meetings and assemblies 
in order to discuss and to make decisions. In contrast to this model, citizens in 
modern representative democratic regimes have a very limited executive power,
which is left to periodically elected deputies. Nevertheless, citizens exercise
a controlling power over these representatives and indirectly through them in 
decision-making [Andersson 2008: 127]. 
In these regimes, the execution of political power is regarded as legitimat-
ed − moreover, as democratically legitimated − if it is accountable [Blühdorn 
2009]. Those with delegated authority are accountable for their actions and its 
consequences to the citizens: this is often referred to as political accountabil-
ity [Day & Klein 1987: 27; Rhodes 1997]. They are accountable especially via 
elections. The controlling power of citizens is primarily exercised “in elections, 
in which the elected representatives are held accountable for their behavior in 
offi ce” [Andersson 2008: 127]. But, as said, those holding political power need 
to have decisions executed and implemented, and, hence, they also need an ef-
fi cient administration and experts. The fi rst ones (that is, those with delegated 
authority) are answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed 
criteria of performance. Of course, administrative and agencies in charge of 
devising and implementing strategies and decisions are involved as well and 
they are, in turn, accountable to some external political authority [Meckstroth
2009].
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This sensible structure resembles what French philosopher Jacques Rancière 
has referred to as “police”. What is “police”? Policemen are evoked by this term. 
Am I suggesting that those involved in accountability and evaluation might be 
like policemen? In a certain sense, the answer is yes. At least in many schools and 
other organizations, this answer might not sound surprising − although maybe 
some people would not be willing to expressing it. Nevertheless, it need to be 
qualifi ed. “Police” indeed includes policemen, but “police” is not just a number of 
policemen. According to Rancière himself, the policemen are not but “a particu-
lar form” of police [Rancière 1997: 28]. In his view, “police” is a broader notion. 
It refers to “a more general order that arranges that tangible reality in which bod-
ies are distributed in community” − he writes [Rancière 1997: 28]. Here are two 
other defi nitions by Rancière himself:
(…) the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achie-
ved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution [1992: 28]. 
The police is, essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defi nes a party’s share or lack 
of it. But to defi ne this, you fi rst must defi ne the confi guration of the perceptible in which 
one or the other is inscribed. The police is thus fi rst an order of bodies that defi nes the al-
location of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying and sees that those bodies are 
assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and sayable that 
sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood 
as discourse and another as noise [1999: 29].
As just stated, the police order indeed defi nes “the confi guration of the per-
ceptible”. This means that it “monopolizes the interpretation of sense” because it 
fi lls it with reality and meaning and “delimit[s] the boundaries of the perceptible, 
the thinkable, and the possible” [Tanke 2011: 45−46]. As such, it defi nes who 
is inscribed and who is not. In addition, the police order defi nes ways of be-
ing and ways of doing. Those who are inscribed and named are allocated to tasks
and places. Consequently, it “defi nes a party’s share or lack of it” [Rancière 1999: 
29]. The police order is an “order of distribution”, which derives from an “order 
of intelligibility” [Gunnefl o & Selberg 2010]. It is worth to emphasize here that 
“police” is an order that determines what counts (as visible) and what does not 
count. Also, it determines what counts as an account of it and what does not count 
as such. Moreover, it determines who is to demand the account (and in which 
terms) and who is to give accounts (and in which terms).
Furthermore, the police order is indeed a totalizing order; that is, it combines 
into a total. Following Bingham and Biesta [2010: 34], it may be said that “police” 
is “all-inclusive”: it means that “everyone has a particular place, role or position 
in it”. Rancière himself writes that, in this “matching” of bodies, functions and 
shares, “there is no place for any void” [Rancière 2010b: 36]. There is an “intol-
erance for the void” [Rancière, in: Prozorov 2007: 88]. But in this order, there 
is not only “absence of void” there is also “absence of supplement” [Rancière 
2010b: 36]. It means that there is no place for anything else different to that made 
visible and counted. Thus “all-inclusiveness” coalesces with “exclusion of what 
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‘there is not’” [Rancière 2010b: 36]. Paradoxically, this will-to-include comes at 
the expense of exclusion – maybe unconventional forms of exclusion [Labelle 
2001: 93]. Moreover, it might be said that this order is “sustained by the exclu-
sion of ‘what there is not’” [Prozorov 2007: 88]. This is related to what Rancière 
[2010: 36] has called “partition”, which − according to his own words − “should 
be understood in the double sense of the word: on the one hand, that which sepa-
rates and excludes; on the other, that which allows participation”. For instance, 
children often participate in evaluation but in such a way that they are virtually 
separated and even excluded. 
Finally, a third point is emphasized here on “police”: this totalizing confi gura-
tion of the perceptible is consensual and, thus, the “police” can be conceptualized 
as “(...) the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivi-
ties is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, 
and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” [Rancière 1999: 28]. Rancière 
has written that “consensus is the reduction of politics to the police” and, thus, it 
means the “cancellation” of politics [Rancière 2010b: 42].
In Rancière’s view, most of what is normally understood as politics can be 
thought of as “the police”. However, he is also persuaded that there is a radical 
opposition between police and politics. In his own words, politics is “an extremely 
determined activity antagonistic to policing” [Rancière 1999: 29]. Politics threat-
ens police because the goal of policing is precisely that of avoiding or eliminating 
politics [May 2008].
Using Rancière’s words, politics refers to “the mode of acting that perturbs” 
the police order [2004c: 226] “by supplementing it with a part of those without 
part, identifi ed with the whole of the community” [Rancière 2010b: 36]. First of 
all, it needs to be highlighted that politics is acting. It does not, however, mean 
that politics is in fact everywhere and, thus, everything is political, but rather that 
politics can be anywhere because it can manifest itself at any time in different 
contexts: politics is always a possibility [Davis 2010: 79]. Secondly, politics is an 
event. It is not a permanently functioning and self-improving system but rather 
exceptional moments coming and going. Rancière has written that it is “an activ-
ity that is always of the moment and provisional” [Rancière 2010b: 43] and occurs 
as an “accident” [Rancière 2010b: 35]. I Thirdly, this exceptional and momentary 
action is disturbing. According to Rancière, “the essence of the political is dis-
sensus” [2000: 124]. Dissensus is “the process of politics itself” [Tanke 2011: 61]. 
It is neither an opposition or confl ict of interests, opinions or values [for instance 
Rancière 2004a: 304] nor “a quarrel over which solutions to apply to a situation 
but a dispute over the situation itself” [Rancière 2004b: 6]. He asserts that it is
“a dispute about what is given, about the frame within which we see something 
as given” [Rancière 2004a: 304]. It affects “the givens of a particular situation, of 
what is seen and what might be said, on the question of who is qualifi ed to see or 
say what is given” [Rancière 2000: 124].
Furthermore, Rancière virtually equates politics with democracy because, 
according to him, democracy emerges from a “disagreement” (not consensus) 
between these two parts [Labelle 2001: 87]: on the one hand, the police order and, 
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on the other hand, the demos. But what is the demos? Who is the demos? Maybe 
everybody? He reminds us that democracy was “a term invented by its oppo-
nents, by all those who had an ‘entitlement’ to govern” – by virtue of a distinct 
and unequal seniority, birth, wealth, virtue or knowledge [Rancière 2010b: 32]. 
But, according to him, “before being the name of a community, the demos is the 
name of a part of the community” [Rancière 2010b: 32]. Who is this part? In his 
work, the demos is equated to “the part that has no part” [for instance May 2008]. 
In other words, they are “simply the people who do not count”: “to be of the 
demos is to be outside of the count” [Rancière 2010: 32; italics added]. It implies 
having “no entitlement to exercise the power of the arkhe, none for which they 
might be counted” [Rancière 2010b: 32]. They are those whose full existence is 
not considered to be relevant within the police order and, therefore, have no share 
(or an inferior share) in the decision-making process ordering their lives whilst 
coming to defi ne themselves as being no part and having no part [Labelle 2001; 
May 2008; Davis 2010]. 
As stated earlier, politics or democracy is momentary and provisional; cor-
respondingly, “its subjects are always precarious” [Rancière 2010: 39]. But when 
those who have no recognized part in the social order, who do not “count”, who 
are invisible or inaudible politically speaking, assert their egalitarian claim, 
they come into being as political subjects, and they do this through disagree-
ment [Tanke 2011: 44]. In this way, disagreement creates political subjectivities. 
“Subjectivation” or “subjectifi cation” is the term that Rancière chooses for this 
process of emancipation which consist of coming to be political subject by strug-
gling for existence.
Conclusions
In a essay on education recently translated to English, Rancière [2010a: 19] links 
accountability in education with competition and privatization and highlights 
that many educational constituencies have embraced them “as solutions”, par-
ticularly “on the assumption that student underachievement will be remedied 
by the magic circle connecting these three points of hope”. The result is still 
incessant accountability incessantly awaiting for solutions. According to him, 
accountability is itself a mere “explanatory scheme” [Rancière 2010a: 21−22]. It 
is a part of the confi guration of the reality that has been referred to as “police” − 
and, thus, it might be hindering democracy. And here lies the problem: in his own 
words, “explanations serve to cover up the fact that explanations are themselves 
the problem” [Rancière 2010a: 21]. 
As a part of it, those explanations sustain a permanently functioning order, 
not disagreement and rupture needed to make relevant changes. According to 
Rancière, “they explain [and sustain −let me add] the shape of the educational 
landscape rather than intervening in any way on educational practices” [Rancière 
2010b: 22]. However, it has been suggested that education does not only contrib-
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ute to qualifi cation or socialization, which rather contribute to compliance with 
and, at least, adjustment to existing orders; education is also relevant to subjecti-
fi cation, which leads to be responsive to “ways of being that hint at independence 
from such orders” [Biesta 2004: 40], being this responsiveness open to challenge 
and disruption.
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